How Exposed Is India to Foreign Technology?

24 Oct 2026

Tags: Internal Security   Cyber & Media   Digital threats

Source: The Hindu

Context: According to The Wall Street Journal, Elon Musk’s SpaceX restricted Ukraine’s access to its military-oriented Starshield satellite network in connection with Ukraine’s attacks on Russian oil infrastructure. The episode highlights the risks of relying on technology controlled by foreign companies or governments.

• Key concern: Foreign dependence can expose India to service restrictions, disruption of domestic systems through foreign-controlled platforms, or gradual degradation of its ability to sustain critical capabilities.
• Strategic autonomy: Developing domestic technological capabilities is essential for national security, economic resilience and uninterrupted delivery of essential services.

Satellite Communications

• India’s position: The government has licensed Starlink, Eutelsat OneWeb’s Indian subsidiary and Jio Satellite Communications to provide satellite communication services. As reported in the article, as of October 16, 2026, the three had yet to obtain the security clearances required to offer commercial satellite broadband.
• Foreign control risks: SpaceX controls Starlink’s network; Eutelsat OneWeb is influenced by European ownership and government interests; and Jio’s joint venture with Luxembourg-based SES relies on SES satellites. Indian ownership of a company does not necessarily imply control over the underlying technology or network.
• Existing domestic capabilities: India is not heavily dependent on foreign satellite networks for ordinary telecommunications because most telephone and internet traffic travels through terrestrial networks. ISRO’s communication satellites support broadcasting and strategic communications, while dedicated military satellite communication capabilities provide additional support.
• Key takeaway: Satellite broadband dependence and dependence on satellite communications generally are distinct issues; the article focuses on the former.

Satellite Navigation: Vulnerability of NavIC

• NavIC: The Navigation with Indian Constellation is India’s regional satellite navigation system, designed to provide positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) services over India and the surrounding region.
• Operational weakness: According to the parliamentary statement cited in the article, only three NavIC satellites were providing PNT signals, below the minimum of four satellites required for standalone positioning. This limits India’s ability to rely independently on its navigation system.
• Dependence on GPS: The U.S. discontinued its policy of deliberately degrading civilian GPS accuracy in 2000 but retains the ability to deny PNT services for military purposes in specific areas.
• Underlying constraint: Difficulties in improving ISRO’s launch rate have contributed to challenges in maintaining NavIC’s operational continuity.
• Strategic implication: Navigation independence requires a functional satellite constellation, timely replacement launches and resilient ground infrastructure.

Cloud Computing and Information Technology

• Foreign cloud providers: Amazon Web Services (AWS), Microsoft Azure and Google Cloud supply infrastructure and managed services to Indian businesses and public institutions. Gartner projected Indian expenditure on cloud services at $17.5 billion in 2026.
• Domestic infrastructure: The government operates MeghRaj, its cloud initiative managed through the National Informatics Centre (NIC). In December 2025, the government reported that 2,170 ministries and departments hosted applications on MeghRaj, although it also relied on empanelled private cloud providers, including foreign companies.
• MeghRaj 2.0 and AWS Outposts: The proposed arrangement allows AWS-managed cloud services to operate from NIC data centres, helping keep data physically within India. However, Outposts depend on connectivity to AWS’s regional control systems for monitoring and software updates, creating potential external management dependencies.
• Open-source alternatives: Greater adoption of open-source software can reduce dependence on proprietary vendors. The government’s 2015 policy preferred open-source software for e-governance, while the Centre for Development of Advanced Computing (C-DAC) developed the Linux-based Bharat Operating System Solutions (BOSS).
• Cybersecurity and software reliability: A defective CrowdStrike update disrupted Windows-based systems worldwide, including Indian airlines, airports and securities firms. This illustrates that technological vulnerability can arise from accidental failures as well as deliberate restrictions.

Digital Payments: UPI as a Strategic Advantage

• Domestic infrastructure: The National Payments Corporation of India (NPCI) operates the Unified Payments Interface (UPI), reducing India's dependence on foreign card networks such as Visa and Mastercard for domestic digital payments.
• Application-layer dependence: Consumer-facing services such as Google Pay are foreign-controlled, but their withdrawal would not automatically disrupt UPI itself because users can switch to other applications, including PhonePe.
• Distinction between ownership and infrastructure: Walmart holds a majority stake in PhonePe but does not thereby control UPI’s underlying payment infrastructure. This differs from arrangements in which an Indian business depends directly on a foreign-controlled satellite network.
• International financial exposure: Banks rely on cross-border payment and correspondent banking networks. In 2022, the European Union restricted selected Russian banks’ access to SWIFT, the international financial messaging network, demonstrating how geopolitical sanctions can disrupt international financial connectivity.
• Limitation: UPI strengthens domestic payment autonomy but cannot eliminate risks arising from international banking relationships, sanctions or cross-border commerce.

Military Equipment: Dependence on Foreign Suppliers

• Impact of sanctions: Following India’s 1998 nuclear tests under Operation Shakti, the U.S. imposed sanctions that restricted certain military supplies. The Comptroller and Auditor General subsequently reported that Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) could not obtain 30 U.S.-manufactured LHTEC T800 helicopter engines ordered in April 1998, forcing it to seek replacements from a French manufacturer.
• Import dependence: According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), India was the world’s second-largest importer of major arms during 2021–2025, with Russia accounting for 40% of its imports. France, Israel and the U.S. are also important suppliers.
• Indigenous production constraints: Even the domestically developed Tejas fighter aircraft depends on U.S.-manufactured GE Aerospace engines. Delivery delays have constrained production and affected delivery schedules.
• Strategic implication: Indigenous platforms cannot achieve complete autonomy when critical engines, components, software or maintenance capabilities remain dependent on foreign suppliers.

Way Forward: Strengthening India’s Technological Sovereignty

• Build domestic capabilities: Accelerate indigenous satellite communications, navigation systems, cloud infrastructure, semiconductor manufacturing, critical software and defence technologies.
• Reduce single-vendor dependence: Diversify suppliers, maintain alternative service providers and develop contingency arrangements for essential infrastructure.
• Strengthen domestic control: Ensure that data localisation is complemented by control over software updates, system administration, encryption keys and critical network operations.
• Improve technological resilience: Invest in backup systems, cybersecurity testing, redundant infrastructure and rapid replacement capabilities for satellites and military components.
• Promote open-source technologies: Expand the use of interoperable, auditable software to reduce vendor lock-in and improve long-term maintainability.
• Balance self-reliance with global integration: Technological sovereignty does not require complete isolation from foreign technology. It requires the capacity to maintain essential services and national security even when external supplies or services are interrupted.

Important Terms for UPSC

• Technological sovereignty: The ability of a country to control, operate and sustain critical technologies without being excessively vulnerable to external actors.
• Vendor lock-in: Dependence on a particular supplier’s proprietary technology, making it difficult or costly to switch providers.
• Data localisation: Storing specified categories of data within a country’s territorial boundaries; this does not automatically ensure domestic control over the systems processing that data.
• SWIFT: The Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication, a cooperative messaging network that enables financial institutions to exchange standardised transaction instructions. It is not itself a payment settlement system.
• Strategic autonomy: The ability to make independent foreign-policy, security and economic decisions while engaging with international partners.